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The Demand for Agricul'bural Research by S'ba'fce Govemmen'ts
By jyoti Khanna, Wallace E. Huffman and Todd Sandier*
Public agricultural research in 'the United States is conducted- by state
agricultural experiment stations (SAES) and'by the' research agencies of the
USDA.. Both have research.'activities 'in ;every state." A. vast^ amount "of
research and experiments has shown that the'-performance of plants and to-a
lesser extent animals', ' in which! new technologies are frequently-embodied,' is
altered by ,local geoclimatic conditions-that; differ within' and between states.
Basic research and livestock .research"^ to- some extent lead to new knowledge or
technologies that spill widely across^ state boundaries^; '-Thus, public-^
agricultural-.research produces-knowledge .that/is both^ state specific' and
general. ' a > ; " i • . • .'^r
State government'^decisions are criticali-in-i'the funding of SAES research
.and are a major factor in funding of public agricultural-research in general.
The federal,.government provides 'all of • the funding -ifor its own research-- -
activities in the rstates.-.t <• The state, agricultural experiment'-stations', are
funded-from^state government tax receiptis •and cash-transfers. Both public
sector .and ^private sector transfers are ^involved. '-The portion-of federal
transfers' that'are Regular Hatch Act appropriations*requires'matching dollar-
for-dollar. with ^nonfederaL funds. 'In 1-984 ...these funds^accounted for only 15%
of total nonfederal SAES funding. .i Thus,: the^nonfederal funds-exceeded greatly
the'amount-needed to. match" Hatch funds".. >.About---77% of- the'nonfederal funds are
from state government's.- 'Socially efficient state government'decisions become
complex, however, when interstate spillover:'effects-'are ah important .
characteristic of .public-agriculturalj.research.
. > Earlier, .theoretical'^and: empirical studies of-the- demand for SAES —
2research have primarily used competitive interest group theories of state
government decision making (e.g., de Gorter and Zilberman; Guttman; Huffman
and Miranowski; Evenson and Rose-Ackerman.i/ These models are a reasonable
specification for attempts to explain cross-sectional differences in the
funding of public agricultural research. This approach seems, however, to
have relatively little to say about what has driven the large increase in real
public expenditures on agricultural research during the post-World War II
period. This increase is slightly larger than 100% during 1950-85. These
changes most likely have been driven by income and price effects operating
through state government decision making.
The objectives of this paper are (i) to present a theoretical model of
state government decision making on agricultural research in which this
research produces state-specific private goods and public goods that spill
across state boundaries, and (ii) to fit an econometric specification of the
demand functions to a -34 year time series of data for each of the 48
contiguous states in the United States, The primary outcomes of this
empirical analysis are estimates of price and income elasticities of demand
for agricultural research in each state. In particular, we find that the
demand for public agricultural research is highly price elastic (in fact,
substantially larger than one in absolute value in most states) but full
income inelastic, largely bounded between 0.2 and 0.8. The results also
provide overwhelming evidence in favor of the joint-products model of the
demand for agricultural research input, except for a few states where dairy
research is relatively important. Thus, state governments cannot in general
expect to borrow all of their agricultural research products or well adapted
new technologies from research that has been conducted exclusively in other
3states. • '
The organization of the paper is as follows: Institutional background
on the organization and funding of public 'agricultural research is first
presented-. Second, a conceptual model of the demand by state governments for
agricultural reVearch, "when it is an input "producing'-state-specific'private
goods and ^pure public goods, is presented". The third section summarizes the
data and presents the econometric model of state government demand for
agricultural research". The fourth* section contains the econometric estimates
of the demand functions'arid an evaluation of the results. The final section
presents some conclusions -and implications for future research.
" " • ' Background ' ' '
Public agricultural research' in the United' States is' conducted by the
USDA in"-its• own-research-agencies-'-Agricultural Research Service, Economic"
Research Service,-Forestry Service--arid by'the'state^'agricultural'experiment
stations (SAES)'. Some-of the USDA's o'im research activities are conducted in
all states (Huffman and Evenson 1989, Ch. 3), and each state has its own
agricultural experimerit-station-. Almost all" SAES are'organized with a main
station- located on or 'closely associated with 'a 'larid-'grant university and'one
or more substations or regional' stations i" The' latter'stations are located* to
take advantage of"differences-Iri local geoclimatic'differences that affect the
performance and need^for new technologies (Hiiffinan and Evensori 1989', 'Ch. 3;
Evenson 1989). ' ''' i ' • -j? • . ji '
Spillovers or spillins of various types are a central characteristic of
agricultural research-(E-vensori 1989).' These'can be's\immarized as
interlocational", interfoci, intercommodity/'arid interse'ctoral based on the
range of potential-spills across geographical re'gions ,• broad fields of
4science, commodities, and sectors. For each class, direct and indirect forms
can be distinguished. Of special interest to this study is the nature of
interlocational spillovers or spillins. A vast amount of experimental and
farm experience has shown that the performance of plants and animals (in which
new technology is frequently embodied) is altered by differences in soils,
temperature, moisture, and photoperiod characteristics of the producing
environment.
Locational spillovers are greater between two locations having similar
geoclimatic characteristics than between locations having dissimilar
characteristics. Most states are located in more than one geoclimatic
subregion, so the benefits of new SAES technology seem unlikely to be equally
applicable to all areas even in a given state (Evenson 1989; Huffman and
Evenson 1989). Some of the benefits will spill perfectly into other states
located in the same subregion, but the degree of .spillin decreases for states
that are located a greater distance,apart and have greater differences in
geoclimatic characteristics.
The size of relevant regions for considering spillovers (spillins) of
new crop and livestock technologies differs. Evenson (1989) presents some
evidence that livestock research spills more fully over a larger area on
average than crop research. Livestock technologies seem to be less sensitive
to small changes in local climate; they are generally not very photoperiod
sensitive. Thus, state specific benefits of research are relatively more
important for crop than livestock research. The discoveries from livestock
research seem to spill quite generally across state boundaries.
The federal government provides, all of the funding for its own research
activities at USDA research institutions. The state agricultural experiment
stations are funded by state governments from state tax receipts and from
5transfers. Transfers from both the public and private sector-are involved.
Public sector transfers are from the federal government; some require
matching, e.g., Regular. Hatch Act funds, .and others do not.r Private sector
transfers originate from commodity groups through allocations from check-off
progr^s and from private sector companies. The SAES - funds received from
state appropriations and from Regular Hatch appropriations, are largely-
unrestricted in, terms of the type of research .that, can be undertaken. Much of
the other federal funds and ,almost all research funded with private, sector,
transfers are tied to specific research projects.
State government decisions are critical in. the•-funding .of ;SAES research
and are a major factor in total public research funding. For example, in 1984
the total research budget of the USDA and SAES system, was $1,575 million: the
USDA's own ,research budget was $515.8 million, and the SAES system, budget was
$1,059 million or 67% of the total (Huffman and Evenson 1989, Ch.- 2 and 3),.
The SAES system received $181 million of_^JJSDA administered federal funds, but
only $114 million were Regular Hatch Act appropriations that required matching
dollar-for-dollar with nonfederal funds. Regular Hatch funds were only 14.9%
of SAES systems nonfederal funds •($114/$763xlp0) , and^nonfederal funds of the
SAES system exceeded by. 85.1% the amount required to match Regular Hatch-
-funds-. Thus, the nonfederal' funds exceeded by-a largemargin the amount
needed for matching federa.1 funds.,
The decision making and lobbying processes -for the agricultural
experiment station budgets are,different in every state. -In most states, the
SAES budget is part of a university budget .request .that is sent to the state
legislature. For example in Florida, Iowa,, Minnesota,-and North Carolina;-the
SAES budget is a^ separate line-item in the ..budget; request^ that goes to the
6state legislature. This procedure establishes a direct link between
legislative decisions and the SAES budget. However, in California and New
York, the SAES budget does not appear in the budgets prepared by the
University of California and the State University of New York systems.'
Furthermore, the director of the California agricultural experiment station is
prohibited from lobbying the state legislature for funds.
In contrast, in Texas and at the New Haven .(CT) station, the
agricultural experiment stations are independent state agencies. The budget
is prepared by the director, and he takes his request directly to the state
legislature and lobbies for it.
The Conceptual Model
Because states are heterogeneous in geoclimatic conditions and in their
institutional budget linkages between the SAES and state legislature, a state-
specific model is suggested. The model is the basis for the empirical demand
functions of state legislatures for public agricultural research. State
governments provide private and public goods (or inputs) using available
resources. It is well known that private collective action supplies sub-
Pareto optimal quantities of a public good, and the government sector might do
better (Bator; Olson; Comes and Sandier, 1986). The Nash model presented is
one of joint-products. (Also, see Comes and Sandier 1984 and 1986; Andreoni;
Sandier and Murdoch.) Most of the modern treatment of public goods and
externalities has invoked Nash behavior when depicting an equilibrium
allocation. Since states preserve much autonomy over their decisions on
agricultural research expenditures, a Nash assumption, in which each state
views the spillins of research benefits as given, is appropriate.
In this model, public agricultural research (SAES and USDA) is a
7publicly supplied input that producesitwo commodities: One commodity has pure
private good characteristics,- which.jprovides state specific benefits, and the
other is ,a pure public good,-.-which provides benefits -tO' the 'state where' the
research is conducted and which .spills into other states. ' Although the
ultimate beneficiaries from these commodities are primarily agricultural
producers and consumers of agricultural products, xwe do not model the
distribution of benefits between these groups. We believe that (over the time
period of our empirical analysis) shifts in the distribution of benefits are
not the primary explanation for changes in the demand for research in any
particular state over time. An extensive examination of the effect of
distribution of benefits on the demand for public agricultural .research,
however, can be found in de Gorter and Zilberman.^
Each state legislature is assumed to .have a well-behaved neoclassical
utility function, with possibly different parameters that depends on a pure
public good and a pure private good (22^^) both of which are produced
from an input of public agricultural research (x^) and an alternative
composite publicly provided private good (Yj^):
(1) Ui =,Ui(Zii, Z2i..Yi; Ei-),-
where E^ is an environmental variable.V" Within state i,- the production of
and Z2 is represented simply as:
(2) zii = fi(Xi), fi' > 0. fi" <0,
(3) Z2i = f2(xi), fa' > Oi f2" < '
where primes denote first and second derivatives.^ The variable x^^ denotes
the ith state's voluntary and nonvoluntary contributions. Voluntary
contributions are those decided at the state level (i.e., SAES), while
8nonvoluntary contributions are federal agricultural research expenditures
(i.e., USDA) in the state. Since the public output zj^ is a regionwide public
good, each state receives its output of Z]^, and those of the other states so
that the total quantity of the public output available for consumption by the
ith state legislature is
(4) Zi^ = zii +
where = E is the total quantity derived from the other states and
j+i
is termed an output "spillin" to the ith state. By (2), we have
(5) = E fi(xO = h( E X.),
j+i
in which h(*) is an aggregate function with h' > 0 and h" < 0. Equations
(4)-(5) imply that public agricultural research outputs, produced in other
states of the region, are a perfect substitute for the state's own public
research output.-^
The expenditures on agricultural research have been shown to have
effects on agricultural productivity that start after 1 or 2 years and
continue for 30-40 additional years (Pardee and Craig; Huffman and Evenson
1989; Knutsen and Tweeten). Thus, state tax collections are taken as
exogenous to current decisions on x^ and . The ith state legislature's
budget constraint is
(6) + PyYi =
in which x^ denotes voluntary and nonvoluntary contributions to state i. In
(6), is the price of public agricultural research, Py is the price of the
publicly provided private good, and is the total budget (revenues)
available to the ith state legislature, including intergovernmental cash
9transfers.-^ Nonvoluntary contributions are paid by federal taxes. To derive
the ith state legislature's demand for regionwide voluntary and nonvoluntary
contributions for agricultural research, we transformi'the^budget -constraint in
(6) into'a ."full income" constraint:,by adding the value of input spillins,
b6th =sides of '(6), where'X^ = 'and-includes voluntary and ' '
nonvoluntary contributions. The full income constraint is '
(7) + PyYi =
where denotes full income. The quantity denotes^the total input from
voluntary contributions, resulting from all state legislative decisions, and
nonvoluntary contribution,, which are the federal government's contributions,
to public agricultural research, e.g., Xj^ = .E Xj^.- .
' r., I ,i •.
By (2) - (5), the utility function in (1) can be expressed as
(8) Ui = Ui[fi(Xi) +h(X^), f2(Xi). Yii EiJ.
, - 1: . f • ' • ..V- . •
By the identity x^ = X^^ " the utility function can be expressedvin terms
of its basic arguments or inputs: '
(9) Vi = 'Vi(X-i, Yi, Xi'; Ei)r ^
where is a hybrid utility function that embodies laoth the properties of the
utility function and the production functions f]^(*), f2(*), and h(*).
The quantity Xj^ is taken as a fixed magnitude in the utility function because
-1, • • • _.r. • -
it is not determined directly by state i, but it is important for determining
the quantity of the pure private good that is available from X^ to "state i.
In a full income approach, a state legislature is assumed to behave as if it
chooses Yji^ and the aggregate quantity of X^ by:
10
(10) Max (V,(Xi. Yi. ^i) | + P^X^).
{Xi.Y^}
in which the implicit constraint X^^ > X^ is imposed.
Under quite general conditions, the first-order conditions for optimal
decisions on Xj^ and can be solved implicitly to obtain the legislature's
demand functions:
(11) xj = dx^(Fi, P^, Py. Xi, El),
(12) Y? = dY.(Fi, P^, Py, Xi, E^),
Thus, in the joint-product model of the demand for publicly provided
goods, the demand for agricultural research is driven by the price of
agricultural research, the price of the alternative good, state government
full income, a spillin variable, and an environmental variable. This is in
contrast to the interest group model developed by de Gorter and Zilberman,
which is more appropriate for explaining differences in a single cross-
section.
A Nash equilibrium is reached when each of the n legislatures in a
region demand an allocation X* and Y* such that X* - X*, for i, £=1, .. . ,n and
i* t. That is, in Nash equilibrium, all states in a region must demand the
same aggregate quantity of the public agricultural research input (but not of
the private good Y ). This Nash equilibrixim for X in the joint-products model
is apt to be sub-Pareto optimal, as in the Nash equilibrium in the pure
public-goods model (Cornes and Sandier 1986, pp. 76-77). In the joint-
products model, the neutrality of alternative sources of resources for funding
public research does not hold. A reallocation of income so that a change of
is offset by an equal an opposite change in the value of spillins (Pj^Xj[^)
does not leave a state's demand for agricultural research unchanged. (Also,
.11 ^
see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian; Sandier and Murdoch; Andreoni.) The reason
is that a state only obtains more of the pure private good Z2 from additional
research conducted inside its boundaries, not from additional research
conducted in other states. In contrast, for a Nash equilibrium in a.pure
public-goods model, the source of resources does not affect the demand for
agricultural research, i.e., Xj^ would not enter equations (9).-(12),
separately (Sandier and Murdoch, 1990, p. 879).
The Data and Econometric Model
. • . .7"! ^ o:. ^ •
Demand equations for public agricultural research are to be fitted
separately for each of the 48 states in the contiguous United States for the
; . . ,-j ' •; : r ' i . . 3' z
period 1951-85. v
1 < '< }' i, •
The Data
A state's quantity of public agricultural research is derived as
expenditures on SAES and USDA agricultural research in the state divided by a
- ' . -'I':.' "i., -••J y ' • .iJ' ' r--
national index of the price of agricultural research. State expenditures on
• •' . 'v/.'. O • -<1. J
agricultural research are reported in United States Department of Agriculture-
• , • 'jj; -' - .. •
Cooperative State Research Service (USDA-CSRS), Funds for Research in State
Agricultural Experiment Stations and'Other State Institutions, for 1951-1966
and in USDA-CSRS, Inventory of Agricultural Research, for 1967 and later
years. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's expenditures on its own research
activities in the states were obtained from USDA-CSRS, Inventory of
Agricultural Research. 1968-1985. For the earlier years, from 1951-1967, the
data were derived for each state using data on SAES expenditures on
agricultural research and the ratio of total public expenditures on
r . • r'f.' • y <' • * i •
agricultural research-to SAES expenditures on agricultural research in 1968.
Total public expenditures on agricultural research were obtained as the
12
siommation of state and federal expenditures.
The price index for agricultural research (P,^) is a weighted average of
price indexes for scientists' time and for other nonlabor inputs. The index
is taken from Huffman and Evenson 1989 (Ch. 2), It is a weighted average of
an index of salaries of college and university faculty members (70%) (American
Association of University Professors) and the wholesale price index (30%)
(Executive Office of the President).-^ The weights between salaries and
f
nonsalary items represent the 1951-85 period well. The wholesale price index
was used for nonsalary items because of a need for representing prices of
items that do not have a large labor cost share. The set of goods included in
the index, however, is broader than the set of nonlabor inputs purchased by
agricultural experiment stations.-^
The price index for the composite private good supplied by state
governments (Py) is the implicit GDP deflator for goods and services purchased
by state and local governments (U.S. Dept. Comm., Statistical Abstract and
Historical Statistics^. This index is not perfect because it includes state
government expenditures on agricultural research. Because these expenditures
are a small percentage of total state government expenditures, the implicit
GNP deflator covers primarily the nonresearch goods and services.
The cash budget constraint of the state legislature is measured as total
state government revenue, including cash intergovernmental transfers (U.S.
Dept. Comm., Statistical Abstract").
A classification scheme, based on geoclimatic considerations, was used
to group states into similar geoclimatic regions, and these regional groups
were used to define spillover variables. All classification schemes are
somewhat arbitrary.-^ However, agricultural production patterns in each state
were examined using production intensity maps (U.S. Dept. Comm. 1975). States
13
having similar geoclimatic conditions and broadly, similar production patterns
were grouped into the ;Same region. This classification scheme was constructed
so that regional boundaries coincided with state boundaries; that it, a state
was included only in one region and not partitioned into two (or more)
regions. This seems to fit well into our framework of state legislative
decision-making. Also, the regions seem large enough to capture the potential
flow of research across states having similar conditionsThe regional
classification of the states is presented in Table 1.
The Econometric Model
An econometric model is a specification that takes account of several
special features of our data and economic model. The demand equations for
agricultural research are permitted to have different par^eters in each
state. However, the variables that drive these demand equations over time are
believed to be the same. State-specific fixed-effects that do not vary over
time, e.g., the relative strength'of producers' and consumers' groups, do not
enter these demand equations, except through the intercept.
Because all states are trying to decide at approximately the same time
on the demand for agricultural research, X and F are random variables and are
correlated with the randoiir~dlsturbances in the demand equations for public
agricultural research by each state. An instrumental variable estimation
procedure is to be applied and is an acceptable route to consistent estimates
of the demand equations (Greene, p.300-302). In addition, annual time series
data frequently exhibit momentum, which causes .disturbances in behavioral
equations to be correlated. This problem needs to be corrected to Improve the
reliability of test statistics and efficiency of the estimator (Greene,
Ch. 15).
To take account of these special features, a three-equation model
14
potentially having first-order autocorrelation of disturbances is specified:
(13) InX^ - /3g +;8^ InP*^ +0^ InSPILL^^. 4-
It
_ n^
(14) InF^^. - 70 ^ yt l^Itt + l^^xt ^it
f-1
n^
(15) InSPILL^^ - 6^ + 5^ Inl^^ + ^ ^t
where
r
X^. = quantity index for total public (voluntary and nonvoluntary)
agricultural research activity in region r during year t,
*
= relative price index for public research activity during
year t, Pxt/^yf
r r
SPILLj^^ = —x^., the real spillins of total public (voluntary
and nonvoluntary) research to state i in year
t, or the quantity of public in-kind transfers,
= real state revenue, state government revenue
divided by the implicit GDP deflator for state and
local governments,
F = + P*^. SPILLJj., real full income for state
government i in year t,
y^s, = unknown coefficients,
n^ = the number of states in region r,
®it»*'it ~ random disturbance terms,
= e^^. — a random disturbance term represented by
a first order autoregressive process,
|p| < 1, EejLt- 0.
15
The model, which is linear in the logarithms of the variables, outperforms a
linear in levels specification, and the coefficients are elasticities.
Efficiency and good test statistics are desirable properties for
equation (13), but they are not important for equations (14)"and (15).ii/ The
latter two equations need only to provide consistent forecasts of InF and
InSPILL, and these can be obtained from OLS estimates. Thus, the steps in the
estimation process are as follows. First, equations (13)-(15) are fitted with
p = 0, and the null hypothesis that p = 0 is tested. Second, if p is
significantly different from zero at the .05 level, the estimate of p, p, is
used to transform the variables in (13), including the predicted values of In
F and InSPILL. Tlie first observation is transformed by /l - p. Equations
(13)-(15) are then refitted using two-stage least squares.
In equation (13), if 183 is not significantly different from zero, then
the distribution of full income between cash and in-kind or spillin components
is not important for determining a state's demand for public agricultural
research. Thus, when /53 —0, the joint-products model reduces to the pure
public goods model of the demand for agricultural research.
Although we have provided sound reasons why the coefficients of the
demand equations for agricultural research will be different across states,
homogeneity of response is a testable hypothesis. If some of the coefficients
are not significantly different, then we can impose equality and reduce the
number of different coefficients to be estimated and reported and increase the
efficiency of the estimator.
The following null hypotheses are to be tested (against a negative '
alternative) for each of the 5 regions:
(16) for j - 2
16
(17) " ^2j' j " 2,..., n^.
(18) H3 : for j « 2,.... n^,
(19) H^: and H2
(20) H^: and
(21) Hg: H2 and
(22) H^: H^, H2, and H^.
When a null hypothesis cannot be rejected, we will then impose equality
of the coefficients across all states in a region and re-estimate the
equations. If the null hjrpothesis is rejected, this is taken as evidence that
the response elasticities really are different.
Table 1 reports sample mean values of variables used in the econometric
model. The West region is the largest demander of public agricultural
research for the period under analysis, and the Central region and South and
Eastern Uplands rank 2rd and 3rd, respectively. California, Texas, Florida,
and New York supply the largest quantity of public agricultural research.
Rhode Island supplies the smallest. The Northeast relies unusually heavily
upon the USDA for agricultural research compared to the other regions. It is,
however, comprised of many small states in which dairy production is
relatively important, and we expect dairy research conducted in one state in
this region to spill easily across state boundaries. Also, the USDA's
Beltsville Research Center is located in this region, and it is largely
responsible for the agricultural experiment station being only 11% of the
public agricultural research conducted in Maryland.
i 17
. . .The Empirical-Results!
The state government demand functions-for public .'agricultural research
are fitted to annual data^^for. 1951-1985,irfor each'Of> the--48 .^states grouped into
the 5 geoclimatic regions. They-:are obtained by, applying •the least-squares
instr\^ental-yariable estimation.pr,oce,dure, which is implemented by fit-ting
equations (l£3)-(15)j. .Homogeneity,:pf (response-elasticities across all states
in a region,are tested and,-reported in Table^ 2.1 For the -Southern region' and
,the Eastern Upland region, .-the null Jiypqthesis thatt variable-by-variable
equality of response celasticity:;C.annot be^rej ected cat -the-5, percent
significance leyel. For. the .Central region, equality across all states of the
,,, price elasticities and of the spi-llin elasticities cannot be, rejected.
However^, equality: of full lincome elasticities is rejected. In*^ the- Western'
region and Northeast- region, .all of. the null hjrpotheses in equations- (16)-(22)
. are rejected., -.B^oth ofr-these latter regions- are composed of- ari-unusually large
number^ of states,^ ahd -the size: of the'state legislative budgets'range from'
veryr small to. ye^ry^ large. i Furthermore,, these .two regions do include •
California and New ^ork which seem to have.^funusually complicated budget •
request processes- for- the statje.,agr-iculturali experiments station and .the -
Northeast, alsoi includ^s^Maryland, where -the-USDA's Beltsyille/iresearch center
is located.'- • •. jf-.r. j ^
Tables 3-7 report the final estimates of the^ state.-- government demand'
functions for public, agricultural'•research.,! Homogeneity of response
elasticities is JLmpqsed ,biased ruponi-the -tests repor.ted in, Table 2 . The results
taken, as a vwhole .are, ^azingly consistent^with, the> j.oint.-products' modeli of-
-state .government decisionrmaking-p.n agricultural research.-j; First,-42 of the
48 rprice, elasticities a.re negative and only-one-^of the ;6 that are positive is
: 18
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. It is for Delaware
which is an extremely small agricultural state. Second, all of the full-
income elasticities, except one, are positive, and the one that is negative is
not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Third, all of
the elasticities of spillin are significantly different from zero, except for
6 states. The exceptions are Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Kansas, and New Mexico. For these states, the pure public good model is the
better theoretical paradigm. The first 4 of these states are in the Northeast
region where dairy research and milk production are relatively important
compared to cash crops.Livestock, especially dairy research, is expected
to have a large spillin component or a large interstate public good component.
This leaves only Kansas and New Mexico as deviating from expected outcomes.
Our research shows that- state government demand for public agricultural
research is unusually price elastic but is full income inelastic. The states
in the Northern Plains region (Table 3) exhibit the most elastic price
response, ranging from -2.6 to -6.2. In the Southern, South and Eastern
Uplands, and Central regions, the price elasticity is -2.01, -2.13, and -1.54,
respectively. In the Western region, the price elasticities are generally
smaller than for states in the other regions. However, for the two states
where the price elasticity is negative and greater than -1, it is not
significantly different from -1,
Huffman and Miranowski obtained a price inelastic estimate for SAES
research by state governments. Other studies 'of the demand for public
agricultural research and most studies of publicly provided goods have been
unable to come up with price data, and-they therefore ignore the effects of
price on the demand for these goods. Our study shows that state governments
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are very sensitive ,to.the price of public^agricultural research when they make
decisions on the .quantity demanded. Thus, ignoring the price .elasticity would
be ignoring one ,qfthe ,majpr determinants of changes in the demand .for ipublic
agricultural research in the 48-states ,over the,-34 years covered in .this
study. , - I , - 7
In 46 of the 48 states, the full-income/elasticity of demand for public
agricultural research-by state .governments is between'=0.2 and 0'.8.- These are
income inelastic responses, but they aretconsistent withcearlier ;estimates in
the sense that they are, positive,., Wealthier.'states do spend more on public
agricultural research.than.pother states,, and over thej sample- period, the large
increases of state-government ful-1 incomes have been a major .factor;for
explaining the increase in •,the .demand for public agriculturall research. The
' earlier, studies by Huffmanr and,-,.Miranowski, by Guttman, and by Rose-Ackerman
and Eyenson obtained income elastiisities that,,were larger; than one. These
income elas^ticities, however, were fitting to quite different models, and were
explaining real-expenditures on, SAES-research using only a states's: own cash
budget constraint .(which excluded in-kind transfers) ..r..Thus, we'believe that
the differences, in'income elasticity-estimates are.due primarily tol .
differences -in-methods,. - ; • r, - '
Excluding the states^ where the spill-in elasticity- is not significantly
•di-ffsreiit -from zero, all of the'others are positive,: except for Delaware.
These positive and^significantly-different .from zero elasticities .for spillin
show, that state-specifiC' private good aspects, of public agricultural research
are important factors for,,state, government _d,ecisions/on.-.the demand for public
research. ]^rthermbre, ^this type of effect is consistent with
what we_ believe about the^ composition <of products produced -by most public"^
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agricultural research (Evenson 1989; Huffman and Evenson 1989). State-
specific benefits change the incentive structure since failure to do research
will result in lower pay-offs because private benefits would not be available.
The only way that a state can have larger quantities of the pure private good
associated with public agricultural research is for more public agricultural
research to be conducted within its boundaries. • These benefits cannot spillin
from other states. These state-specific private goods seem most important for
crop as opposed to livestock or basic research.
Conclusions and Implications
This paper has presented a theoretical and econometric examination of
the demand for public agricultural research by state governments. The
empirical results showed homogeneity of price, full income, and spillin
elasticities for the states in the South, and homogeneity of price and spillin
elasticities for states in the Central region. States in other regions have a
diversity of response elasticity magnitudes. Our results, however, showed a
consistent pattern of price elastic and income inelastic demand for public
agricultural research. Given the changes in the price of research and states'
real full incomes over the 34 year period 1951-1985, these elasticities, along
with the spillin elasticity, explain a large share of the increase in the
demand for public agricultural research over this period. Except for a few,
primarily dairy-product producing states, the results also supported the
joint-products model of the demand for agricultural research input. Thus,
states must conduct more agricultural research if they want more of the
private good produced by agricultural research input. This seems to be one of
the reasons why agricultural experiment stations have been successful for over
100 years in each of the states. State governments recognize that they cannot
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expect to borrow all of the useful, products of research from activities
conducted outside their state boundaries.. ... ^
Future research ,will explore .the degree :of substitutability.-between USDA
and SAES .research, and the weighting.-of research in lotherr states in evaluating
spillin effects. Al^o,. other public allocation schemes .than.Nash will be
examined. One alternative is the Lindahl cooperative decision-:m^ing scheme
in which public research allocations are Pareto .optimal.t
- , . A
t > '
' 1
SJ'
J >i
' 'J.1'
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FOOTNOTES
*The authors are visiting assistant professor, Cleveland State
University,, and professors, Iowa State University. Helpful comments were
obtained on earlier drafts from Wayne Fuller and James Murdoch. Financial
assistance from the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment station is
acknowledged.
Journal Paper No. J-14114 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics
Experiment Station, Project 2516.
Mother studies include Peterson and Alston, Edwards, and Freebairn.
•^The median voter model is another possible model. For example, see
Bergstrom and Goodman; Borcherding and Deacon; Dudley and Montmarguette. To
implement the median voter model of the demand for publicly provided goods,
the median voter is identified as the median constituent's income. This is a
restrictive assumption. Furthermore, the median voter approach implicitly
assumes that public good issues are of a single voting dimension.
^This utility function imposes minimal restrictions on price and income
elasticities. This is in contrast to the quasi-linear utility function chosen
by de Gorter and Zilberman. The latter function eliminates income effects.
This is very restrictive because we believe that non zero income effects are
very important for explaining changes in the demand for public research
overtime.
^This is clearly one reasonably restrictive specification of the
technology for joint production. The function f]^ (•) can be allowed to differ
by state, but such a complication would not alter our demand equations or
empirical model.
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^Perfect substitutes is a strong assumption.. An attempt to allow for
imperfect substitution possibilities would complicate the modeling
significantly. Future research might explore the effects of, a less
restrictive assumption.
^The model that is presented is one. .of the voluntary, contributions of
state goverrmients_ to_ public agricultural research and nonvolimtary federal
contributions. The assumption is made .that federal,jjrovision of agricultural
research is self-financed by a lump-sum tax on the states. Clearly,,other
taxes are possible and they would change the model. Of course, a more
elaborate^ model consisting o,f two level .(federal vs._ state) decision making on
public agricultural research could be, developed. ,This more complex mpdel,
however, is left to future research., , . ,j.
^Pardee, Craig, and Hallaway^ (1987) present .a. discussion of
agricultural research deflators. • • ;
. '.J." o • I
implicit GDP ,deflator.j^r. goods and, services purchased by state
and local governments was not used as the deflator for public agricultural,
research because the share of professional staff time is significantly larger
for research. The implicit* GDP deflator for state and local governments was
not used ot deflate nonscientist items because it has a labor cost share that
is about 57 percent.
£/The primary alternative specification is one where the relevant region
for spillover effects for a given state is for the spills to flow to the other
47 states. The fit of this model, however, was not good when compared to the
ones where states are grouped into five regions based on geoclimatic
consideration. The results of the single region specification are available
from the authors on request.
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i^Our classification-scheme draws from two classification schemes
already used in the literature. First, the USDA's Economic Research Service
(ERS) production regions groups states into relatively small regions,
sometimes with only two or three states and leads one to suspect that spills
are not fully contained in the region. Second, Evenson (1982), uses a
classification 'scheme based primarily on geoclimatic considerations and does
not follow state boundaries. A state can be in two or more regions. Placing
one state in two or more regions seems inappropriate for our framework when
state legislatures make decisions, given expenditure decisions of other states
in the same region. Hence, neither of these alternative classification
schemes seemed to be an appropriate specification of regions in which
agricultural research spillover effects occur.
U/of course, there are many other instruments that could be employed.
•^^In 1980 milk is 79% of the value of grain and milk production in the
Northeast region. Grain production is' 50% or larger share in the other
regions.
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Table 3: Northern Plains : Instrumental, .Variable. withr Antocorrelation Estimates of
Nash-Coumot Demand for Public Agricultural Research,. 19.51-1985;
.(t^ratios in .parentheses)
Regressors
States p Constant InP*
: Xt
InF.^
i It
InSPILL
I^f.
Kansas -10.611 -2.592 0.755
(1.87)
-0,831
(-4.88) • ; (-1.38) (-1.66)- •
Nebraska -13.270 -5,016 0.244 1.478
" ; (-10.78) • (--3.74)
% j i
'r, (0.65) (4.05)-'
North Dakota -11.094 -4.232 0,210 1,3889
(-5.80) ^ -6.79)
( .
•'^•(12.21) (10.07)
South Dakota -15.170 -6.177 -0.069 1.874
' (-8.53) (^8.85) (-0.56)
• ' • )
(9.93) -
- ^ c , \
r
J
f
1
' J
y'
^ •
j r-
r • f
•
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Table 4: West: Instrumental Variable with Autocorrelation Estimates of
Nash-Coumot Demand for Public Agricultural Research, 1951-1985.
(t-ratios in parentheses)
Regressors
States Constant InP*
xt
InF.^
It
InSPILL
I^t
Arizona -3.390 -1.377 0.561 0.564
(-4.43) (-5.76) (32.35) (11.28)
California - -5.453 -1.961 0.416 0.787
(-4.17) (-4.18) (9.32) (7.22)
Colorado 0.37 -1.808 -0.957 0.661 0.442
(-2.51) (-2.66) (17.09) (5.89)
Idaho - -5.167 -1.587 0.725 0.551
(-6.88) (-6.60) (30.55) (10.71)
Montana 0.41 -2.833 -2.178 0.419 0.769
(-3.82) (-6.17) (14.41) (10.21)
Nevada - -4.398 -2.068 0.489 0.688
(-4.05) (-6.33) (23.39) (10.19)
New Mexico 0.54 0.458 1.023 1.156 -0.180
(0.48) (1.25) (6.58) (-0.91)
Oregon - -4.803 -1.280 0.648 0.582
(-5.68) (-4.65) (27.91) (10.35)
Utah - -4.163 -1.695 0.581 0.593
(-3.73) (-4.83) (20.53) (7.99)
Washington - -6.661 -1.811 0.645 0.660
(-8.69) (-7.37) (28.78) (12.79)
Wyoming - 0.451 -0.341 0.738 0.202
(0.37) (-0.85) (20.04) (2.32)
—/when statistically significant
transform the data.
first-order autocorrelation occurs, p is used to
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Table 5. Northeast: Instr^ental Variable with Autocorrelation Estimates of
Nash-Coumot Demand, for Public, Agricultural Research, 1951-1985.
(t-ratlqs fin .parentheses)
Regressors
States Constant' ' •• InP*
xt
T 1
InF,^ InSPILL^
I^t
Delaware ' ~- 2V.21I • " " "" 1.894'" 0.323 "-0.922
-
' (5.00) :(2.17) ' (4.31) (-3.71)
Connecticut -7.318 -1.208 0.563 0.873
,, ' (-1-77) •/' • - (--1.82) (18.14) 3.28)
Kassachussetts -14.606 -1,899 0.642 1.291
(-3.11) (-2.65) .(i6.33) (4.33)
Maryland 6.840 0.550 0.486 -0.073
.... (3.58) • ^(1.70) (14.69) (-0.68)
Maine -12.938 -1.565 0.745 1.154
- (-2.99) • .(-2.39) '(16.74) ^ (4.25)
New York 7.053 0.335 0.451 -0.134
(3.22) ,r . (0.79) .(14.48) (-1-05)
New Jersey 7.109 ' 0.391 0.412 -0.035
(3.12) (1.02) (13.88) (-0.27)
Pennyslvania " 7.635 0.628 0.502 -0.196
•
:>(3.23) (1.52) j (12.54) (-1.49)
Rhode Island -10.791 -1.705 0.638 1.076
- (-2.63) - • (-2.69)-" (17 .'61) (4.13)
Vermont 0.44' -'-0.965 -0:885 0.568 • 0.491
(-0.53) (-2.04) (13.54) (2.41)
New Hampshire '• -6.781 -r.376- • 0.595 ' • 0.836
(-1.58) (-2.04) (16.13) (3.07)
^When statistically
transform the data.
significant first-order autocorrelation occurs, p is used to
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Table 6. Central Region: Instrumental Variable with Autocorrelation Estimates of
Nash-Coumot Demand for Public Agricultural Research, 1951-1985.
(t-ratios in parentheses)
Regressors
States Constant Ini
★
xt
InFi^ InSPILL
I^t
Indiana -6.368 .537^ 0.701 0.596^
(-11.12) (-1 .19) (25.97) (19.64)
Illinois • -4.505 .537^ 0.542 0.596^
(-8.01) (-1 -19) (21.68) (19.64)
Iowa -6.995 _ .537^ 0.766 0.596^
(-12.06) (-1 .19) (27.43) (19.64)
Michigan • -5.978 _ .537^ 0.636 0.596^
(-10.49) (-1 .19) (26.61) (19.64)
Missouri 0.71 0.107 .537^ 0.272 0.596^
(0.23) (-1 .19) (1.85) (19.64)
Minnesota -4.798 .537^ 0.589 0.596^
(-8.12) (-1 .19) (20.31) (19.64)
Ohio -5.149 .537^ 0.583 0.596^
(-10.34) (-1 .19) (36.02) (19.64)
Wisconsin -3.56 . ' .537^ 0.502 0.596^
(-5.03) (-1 .19) (12.82) (19.64)
.^When statistically significant first-order autocorrelation occurs, p is used to
transform the data.
k/» ^Coefficients were restricted to be equal across states.
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Table 7. Restricted Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Nash-Coumot
Demand for Public Agricultural Research, 1951-1985.
(t-ratlos In parentheses)
Regions
South and
Eastern Uplands
Southern
InP
xt
-2.013
(-25.17)
-2.129
(-6.23)
Regressors
lnF_
It
0.518
(46.14)
0.741
(23.41)
InSPILLT^
It
0.699
(47.93)
0.707
(7.89)
